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It was not without irony that the philosopher Karl Popper (1963, at p. 35) 
told the following anecdote about a meeting with the psychoanalyst 
Alfred Adler:  
 
Once, in 1919, I reported to him a case which to me did 
not seem particularly Adlerian, but which he found no 
difficulty in analyzing in terms of his theory of 
inferiority feelings, although he had not even seen the 
child. Slightly shocked, I asked him how he could be so 
sure. ‘Because of my thousandfold experience,’ he 
replied; whereupon I could not help saying: ‘And with 
this new case, I suppose, your experience has become 
thousand-and-one fold.’ 
 
Although Luhmann formulated with modesty and precaution, for 
example in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (1990a, at pp. 412f.), that 
his theory claims to be a universal one because it is self-referential, the 
“operational closure” that follows from this assumption easily generates a 
problem for empirical research. Can a theory which considers society—
and science as one of its subsystems—operationally closed, nevertheless 
contribute to the project of Enlightenment which Popper (1945) so 
vigorously identified as the driver of an open society? How can a theory 
which proclaims itself to be circular and universal nevertheless claim to 
celebrate “the triumph of the Enlightenment” (Luhmann, 1990a, at p. 
548)? Is the lack of an empirical program of research building on 
Luhmann’s theory fortuitous or does it indicate that this theory should be 
considered as a philosophy rather than a heuristic for the explanation of 
operations in social systems? 
 
In my opinion, Luhmann’s sociological theory of communications 
contains important elements which have hitherto not sufficiently been 
appreciated in the empirical traditions of sociology and communication 
studies (Leydesdorff, 1996; Seidl & Becker, 2006; Grant, 2007). Anthony 
Giddens (1984, at p. xxxvii), for example, had no doubt that “these newer 
versions of Parsonianism, particularly Luhmann and Habermas, were to 
be repudiated despite the sophistication and importance of these authors.” 
However, Giddens focused on explaining action; social structure was 
black-boxed in his “structuration theory” as a “duality” which precedes 
action as “rules and resources,” and follows from the aggregation of 
human actions, for example, as institutions (Leydesdorff, 1993). 
According to Giddens (1984), social structures exist in social reality only 
by implication, i.e., in their “instantiation” in the knowledgeable 
activities of situated actors.  This duality of social structure cannot be 
specified empirically without reference to actions and institutions 
because structure is considered “outside of time-space” (Giddens, 1981, 
at pp. 171f.) and as an “absent set of differences” (Giddens, 1979, at p. 
64).  
 
Giddens’s “virtuality” of structure can also be considered as a dynamic 
extension of the sociological concept of latency (Lazersfeld & Henry, 
1968): the structural dimensions of a social network system are not 
manifest to participating agents. The agents may be able to conjecture 
these dimensions reflexively, but predictably to a variable extent. 
However, Luhmann (1984) theorized about social systems of 
communication as structural, yet not directly observable dynamics; 1  
human agents (“consciousness”) were defined as the (structurally coupled 
and therefore necessary) environment of systems of social coordination 
(Luhmann, 1984, 1986a, 2002). Nevertheless, the communicative 
competencies of the agents and their knowledge base can be expected to 
set limits to their capacity to (a) understand the signals in the network and 
also the situational meaning in which the network structure resounds, (b) 
decompose these two dimensions (that is, the information contents of 
messages and their meaning), and (c) participate in further 
communication by reflexive restructuration of this relation—between the 
                                                 
1 Luhmann, 1984, at p. 226 [1995, at p. 164]: “Die wichtigste Konsequenz dieser 
Analyse ist: daß Kommikation nicht direct beobachtet, sondern nur erschlossen 
warden kann.”  
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information contents of messages and their meaning—in follow-up 
communications. The two systems layers (“consciousness” and 
“communication”) can be considered as reflexively co-evolving (or not!). 
This is appreciated by Luhmann (1977)—following Parsons (1968, at p. 
437)—as “interpenetration.” 
 
The (latent) structure and (virtual) dynamics at the network level can be 
expected to develop non-linearities because of the recursive operation of 
interactions. The outcomes may hence be counter-intuitive for 
participants, and unintended consequences of purposeful action can be 
expected to prevail in a networked environment. Analytical methods like 
factor analysis were developed precisely for the purpose of revealing 
these latent structures. 2  However, the focus in these methodological 
efforts has been on complexity at a specific moment in time, while 
meaning operates in terms of updates over time. The extension of the 
factor-analytic design to a dynamic system is methodologically not a sine 
cure because one needs theoretical guidance to distinguish change in the 
observable variables from change in the latent eigenvectors (Leydesdorff, 
1991, 1997).  
 
From this perspective, Luhmann’s most important contribution has been 
his creative combination of Maturana and Varela’s (1980) biologically 
inspired theory of autopoiesis (or self-organization) with Parsons’s 
structural-functionalism. Parsons theorized the latent functions for the 
case of the social system. In Parsons’s so-called four-function paradigm, 
however, the functions were limited to four or nested multiples of four 
for analytical reasons (Parsons, 1970).3 Merton (e.g., 1973) noted that 
norms and counter-norms historically generate ambivalences about their 
functionality in social systems and that functionalities may therefore 
change over time (Mittrof, 1974). Merton abandoned Parsons’s rigid 
scheme in favor of a focus on historical change. 
 
                                                 
2 A network is constructed in terms of relations (“links”), but the resulting 
architecture of the network also positions the nodes and links in it. Factor 
analysis of the matrix representation of a network enables us to distinguish the 
main axes of such architecture.  
3 The number four was originated by cross-tabling two dichotomies: internal 
versus external and instrumental versus consummatory (Adriaansens, 1976, at pp. 
151f.; Parsons, 1970, at p. 31). 
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In Luhmann’s theory the functions are no longer given, but culturally 
constructed. The processing of meaning in inter-human communication is 
considered recursive: some meanings can be considered as more 
meaningful than others. Knowledge, for example, can be considered as a 
meaning which makes a difference. Meaning can make a difference if the 
knowledge is codified, for example, as discursive knowledge. However, 
the dynamics are more general: in the court room, for example, the 
alleged intentions of the accused can mark the difference between murder 
in the first or second degree, given the legal code which uses these 
categories for its coherence and organization. Thus, the development of 
the communication of meaning in terms of codifications determines the 
complexity which can be handled by a social system. 
 
Knowledge can be codified, but it codifies in turn the underlying 
meaning and information. In other words, codification is a recursive 
operation. At the very bottom, there is only uncertainty or probabilistic 
entropy (Shannon, 1948). When uncertainty is positioned in a network of 
relations, this position can become meaningful. However, meaning is 
provided by a system which itself is updated by positioning the relational 
information. Furthermore, meaning is provided from the perspective of 
hindsight, that is, against the arrow of time, and with reference to future 
possible meanings. Three selections upon the prevailing uncertainty are 
thus relevant: (1) the selection at each moment of time, which structures 
the complex system as a configuration with latent dimensions; (2) the 
selection over time by the system, which potentially stabilizes (or de-
stabilizes) the system; (3) a selection among other possible meanings. 
Luhmann makes reference to Husserl’s (1913, 1929) notion of a horizon 
of possible meanings for the specification of this last selection (cf. 
Luhmann, 1986b).  
 
The horizon of meanings can be considered as next-order or global from 
the perspective of the historical stabilizations and consequent 
institutionalizations of meaning (Grant, 2000). Parsons (1963a and b) 
introduced “symbolic generalization” of codes of communication to 
explain the sometimes binding character of collective action. While the 
first selection can be considered as subsymbolic and the second as 
symbolic—since the information is not only positioned, but the 
information and its position are also acknowledged by the positioning 
system—the third selection from a horizon of meanings is based on 
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symbolic generalization. Using money as the model of an exchange 
medium, Parsons generalized this concept of media to include power and 
influence as other exchange media that can be generalized symbolically.  
 
Luhmann (1975) elaborated on these concepts by considering power, etc., 
as codes of communication, each of which can be generalized in different 
directions. The functional differentiation in the codes of communication 
could thus be associated with the factor-analytic model of eigenvectors. 
Under the condition of modernity exchange media can develop according 
to their own logic, and thus science, politics, the economy, affection, etc., 
can further develop their own specific codes of communication along 
analytically orthogonal axes.  
 
The codes operate also in parallel, and thus generate co-variations. For 
example, everything can be assessed in terms of its economic value or its 
esthetic beauty, and these assessments can no longer be expected to 
correspond because they are coded differently. When the codes of 
communication are functionally differentiated, for example, among 
scientific communications, religious communications, economic 
transactions, or political power relations, more complexity can be 
processed by the communication system as a whole. However, because of 
this functional differentiation among the codes of communication, the 
“whole” tends to disappear: the more complexity can be processed, the 
more transformative the system becomes. Unlike living systems, the 
social system of communications does not need to be integrated into an 
identity performing a life-cycle, The social system can be expected to 
remain differentiated and therefore transformative—using differentiated 
fluxes along nearly orthogonal axes—on the historical organizations of 
meanings.  
 
When the functional differentiation prevails, the latent dimensions 
(eigenvectors) can increasingly take over control functions from the 
observable relations (vectors). In other words, the feedback arrows (in 
Figure 1) from the differentiated self-organization of the communication 
fluxes towards the historically contingent organization of the system can 
become more important than the bottom-up arrow from the historical 
basis towards the transformative dynamics of meaning processing.  
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Differentiated self-organization of communications 
Historical organization of institutional spheres 
 
Figure 1: The model of differentiation in the communication and 
integration in historical organizations 
 
The differentiation among the codes of communication can be considered 
as a historical variable. The more the system is differentiated, the more 
complexity it can process. However, the functionally differentiated 
subsystems remain analytical constructs which co-vary in historical 
events. For example, a decision to organize a school or a household in 
one way or another has different meanings in terms of this entity’s 
earning power, legal status, etc. 
 
Historical events can be considered as instantiations of interactions 
among the functional subsystems. In Giddens’s (1984) language, these 
subsystems provide the “rules and resources” which structure society 
historically. In other words, the subsystems are “operationally closed” in 
the analytical model, but not at the level of historical phenomena: the 
subsystems can be considered as abstract dimensions (“genomena”) in 
which events can be provided with meaning in accordance with the codes 
of communication. The latter are organized in and reorganized by the 
historical instantiations. The differently coded meanings hang together 
and are therefore specifically organized in the historical events to which 
they provide meaning.  
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This historical anchoring of the systems of communication in people, 
organizations, and institutions makes the system at the same time 
transformative and historically contingent. Differentiation and integration 
are two sides of the same coin. However, the “coins” are no longer given 
as hardware, but as operations that develop over time. Thus, the model 
becomes algorithmic instead of geometrical. In my opinion, this model is 
stronger than any of the preceding ones. It combines the strength of the 
factor-model of so-called “eigenvectors” with the dynamic perspective of 
the theory of autopoiesis.  
 
The factors are evolutionarily relevant insofar as they serve as functions 
to the autopoiesis of the system. Since they are operational, they are not 
given as observables. Reflexively, one can hypothesize them in order to 
carry the explanation. This provides the factor model with an empirical 
operationalization: communications can be measured (for example, in 
terms of clusters of words or messages) and analyzed in terms of the 
eigenvectors of a matrix, and one can try to identify the eigenvectors as 
indicators of functionally different codes of communication (Leydesdorff 
& Hellsten, 2005). The model makes us aware that both the codes of 
communication and their content can be expected to change over time.  
 
Unfortunately, the later Luhmann no longer offered his theory as an 
empirical program, but as a universal theory including a different 
epistemology (Luhmann, 1997). In the remainder of this paper, I focus on 
three issues in which the elaboration of an empirical program of research 
can be considered incompatible with Luhmann’s universal theory. These 
are the concepts of information, observation, and language.  
 
Information 
 
Luhmann (1984) followed Gregory Bateson (1972, at p. 462) in defining 
information as “a difference which makes a difference.” Bateson defined 
this as “negentropy” at the level of general systems theory. Luhmann 
applies this concept of information to the social system which processes 
meaning. In other words, the difference makes a difference for the 
differences in meaning. Let us label the differences with subscripts and 
formulate as follows: the difference1 makes a difference2 for the 
differences3 in meaning. 
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Differences1 can be considered as sources of uncertainty or Shannon-type 
information. This flux of information is discarded by Luhmann (e.g., 
1984, at p. 290; 1995, at p. 213) as “erratic:” it is noise or disturbance but 
not yet meaningful information. By making a difference2 for the meaning 
processing, the uncertainty can be selected as meaningful information. As 
Luhmann put it (1995, at p. 67): “By information we mean an event that 
selects systems states.” Because the system is considered as autopoietic, 
it self-selects these system states. It can only absorb information that is 
already meaningful within the system (difference3). All other uncertainty 
is deselected as noise (Grant, 2007). 
 
The empirical researcher can analyze both differences1 and differences2, 
if the research design is reflexive enough in distinguishing between what 
differences may mean from the perspective of participants and analysts 
(Mulkay et al., 1983; Gilbert & Mulkay, 1984; Leydesdorff, 2006). For 
example, in the information sciences distributions of citations have been 
used as indicators of codification (Fujigaki, 1998), and words and co-
occurrences of words as indicators of the change in the meaning of words 
in contexts (Callon et al., 1986; Leydesdorff & Hellsten, 2005). 
Differences3 in the internal meaning processing within systems, however, 
can only be measured if the mechanisms of this processing are properly 
specified. In other words, systems theory is needed for the specification 
of hypotheses and heuristics.  
 
The hypotheses can serve to explain the observable (changes in) 
distributions of communications that would result from the theoretically 
specified processing. However, the Luhmannian programme discarded 
this effort as the explanation of noise (differences1) in favor of a focus on 
the relations between differences2 and differences3. The coupling with 
empirical differences1 is not theoretically appreciated; uncertainty and 
error do not have to be specified. Empirical uncertainty is denied any 
status other than that of an external referent (Luhmann, 1990b).  
 
The systems are considered as operationally closed, not only in the model, 
but also in reality. In my opinion, this resembles a biological model in 
which one assumes that the underlying system is no longer accessible for 
the next-order one because of operational closure. This closure can be 
considered as a membrane. Human languages, however, enable us to 
reconstruct both the meaning and the empirical information contained in 
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messages (Leydesdorff, 2000). In other words, the closure in language 
remains provisional. I come back to this plastic (“infrareflexive”; Latour, 
1988) function of language in a later section, but let me first explain 
Maturana’s biologically inspired model in more detail. 
 
Maturana (2000, at p. 462f.) noted that “a recursion takes place whenever 
a circular or cyclical process is coupled to a linear one, that is, when a 
circular or cyclical process is applied to the consequences (linear 
relational displacement) of its previous application. When there is 
recursion, a new operational domain appears.”  Using this model, the 
domain of meaning processing in social relations appears as a self-
referential and therefore potentially autopoietic domain on the basis of a 
linear flux of information. The information can be provided with meaning 
by reflexive agency. This reflexive agency (“consciousness” in 
Luhmann’s wordings) is embedded in social relations. Interaction terms 
among the agents and the differentiated codifications (operationalised 
above as eigenvectors of the network) can drive this system into a self-
organizing mode. The symbolically generalized media develop as 
specifications of language.  
 
The languaging among the agents and the next-order symbolically 
generalized communications (e.g., economic transactions) are measurable 
as fluxes of information. These can be analyzed statistically (for example, 
using entropy statistics). One may even be able to analyze what part of 
this information is considered by reflexive agents (“consciousness”) and 
the communication systems under study as meaningful information and 
therefore used in the meaning processing of these systems. However, 
Luhmann’s theory uncoupled itself from this information processing by 
focusing exclusively on the circulation of meaning.  
 
Observation 
 
The communication of meaning leaves footprints in the empirical world 
because the two contingencies of information processing and meaning 
processing are coupled, for example, in language. Although the 
explanation of empirical contingencies can be considered as outside the 
scope of Luhmann’s theory, the word “observation” nevertheless plays a 
very important role in this theory. However, the concept of “observation” 
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is provided with a meaning completely different from its use in empirical 
research, where observations inform expectations.  
 
Following Spencer Brown (1963), “observation” is defined by Luhmann 
as a distinction which is followed by a designation. In sociological 
discourse, however, the specification of a distinction followed by a 
designation generates only an observational category. One can specify an 
expectation for the value of this category, but one still needs to proceed 
to measurement in order to test expectations against observations. By 
calling expectations observations, Luhmann’s theorizing is no longer in 
need of measurements.  
 
This abstract notion of observation became increasingly central to 
Luhmann’s theory during the 1990s to the extent that it became—
according to many (e.g., Fuchs, 2004; Baecker, 2005)—more 
foundational than concepts like meaning and communication in earlier 
work. I’ll provide the quotations below, but let me first mention Hans 
Ulrich Gumbrecht (2006, at p. 700) who distinguished three stages in 
Luhmann’s intellectual carreer: first, the stage in which meaning was 
conceptualized as the central concept for sociological theorizing (in 
discussions with Parsons and Habermas, who focused on “action” and 
“communicative action,” respectively) (Luhmann, 1971); secondly, the 
absorption of the theory of autopoiesis mainly during the 1980s 
(Luhmann, 1984); and thirdly, “in the last years of his life the focus was 
on the concept of observation and on the emergence of levels of meta-
observation” (e.g., Luhmann, 1993). Let’s call these theoretical programs 
Luhmann1, Luhmann2, and Luhmann3, respectively.  
 
In my opinion, Luhmann3’s “observation” is based on a misinterpretation 
of Spencer Brown’s (1963) book Laws of Form. This book provides a 
mathematical theory about forms and marks. A central point is that an 
indication can be shaped by a distinction followed by a designation. At 
the very last page (p. 76), the author states that “an observer, since he 
distinguishes the space he occupies, is also a mark. […] We see now that 
the first distinction, the mark, and the observer are not only 
interchangeable, but in the form, identical.” (italics added -LL) The 
formal analogy, however, does not preclude that the two referents are 
substantively different. Spencer Brown’s concept is a mathematical one, 
and observers can be specified biologically (Varela et al., 1991), 
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psychologically (Edelman, 1989), and also, but differently, in terms of 
sociological theorizing (Giddens, 1976; Mulkay et al., 1983; Leydesdorff, 
2006). 
 
Luhmann2 always emphasized the importance of the specification of a 
system of reference when defining concepts because he wished to 
distinguish social systems of communication from “consciousness 
systems,” and these latter two systems from living systems (Luhmann, 
1986a). The first distinction clarifies, for example, when philosophers 
discuss the concept of “freedom” in general. A systems theoretician can 
argue that “freedom” means something different for an individual than 
the institutionalization of civil liberties at the level of society.  
 
Similarly, a distinction followed by a designation provides us only with 
an observational category at the level of the social system or in a 
scientific discourse. One needs to proceed to measurement to provide the 
box with a value; this requires observations by reflexive agents. 
Furthermore, at the level of a social system one expects a distribution of 
possible observations containing an uncertainty (and an error term, which 
can sometimes be reduced by further observational reports).  
 
Paradoxically, Luhmann (1984, 1990a) initially resisted defining the 
“observer” as a central category in his theory, against a dominant 
tendency to do so in systems theory. For example, in his article entitled 
“Cybernetics of Cybernetics,” Von Foerster (1979) countered Maturana’s 
(1969) Theorem Number One that “Anything said is said by an observer” 
with his own Corollary Number One: “Anything said is said to an 
observer.” Luhmann counter-argued in Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft 
(1990a, at p. 14) as follows: 
 
As a result of a long, but unambiguous tradition of 
attributing knowledge to human beings, one can see a 
certain idealization of the observer as a complex of 
measurements and calculations. This is notably the case 
for modern physics in which one is more reflexive on the 
effects of the measurement instruments than on the 
effects of the human operators. Therefore, it would 
almost be possible to abstract from the interpretation of 
an observer as a subject and discuss only “to observe” or 
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“observations.” Such careful distinctions, however, do 
not solve the issue because one has “nach wie vor” only 
one possibility for the identification of an observer and 
that is as a human being. 
 
On the next pages, Luhmann2 preferred to ground his theory on “double 
contingency.” This is indeed an important move, because the second 
layer of the double contingency is based not on contingent observations 
but on the expectation that Alter entertains expectations comparable to 
Ego’s expectations (Vanderstraete, 2002; Parsons, 1951). On the one 
hand, the processing of meaning was thus deeply anchored in 
expectations and intentions. Husserl’s (1929) quest for whether a 
intersubjective intentionality can be considered as a monad different from 
subjectivity was thus brought back on stage and sociologically 
operationalized (Luhmann, 1986b). On the other hand, the specification 
of expectations about expectations provides us with options for empirical 
research in the sociological domain: which expectations are entertained 
by whom, and why (Berger & Luckman, 1966)? How are expectations 
specified and codified, for example, in discourse?  
  
During the 1990s, Luhmann3 became ambivalent about the relations 
between intentions, expectations, and observations. In his chef-d’oeuvre 
of 1997, for example, Husserl and the notion of intentions were 
completely backgrounded. Increasingly, Luhmann accepted during the 
1990s Von Foerster’s formal notion of an “observation” as the central 
category in his own theory. Luhmann (1999, at p. 20), for example, 
formulated this as follows: 
 
How communication is then possible remains, it is true, 
an open question for traditional subjectivism. But our 
answer can now read: through communication, that is to 
say, through the formation of a system of observation sui 
generis, that is through the formation of a social system. 
 
However, Spencer Brown had emphasized that the analogy was only 
formal. As noted above, the social system is not an observer other than 
metaphorically. At the level of an interaction system among observers, a 
distinction plus a designation cannot yet generate an observation, but 
only an observational category. The system of social coordination has no 
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sense organs to perform observations; scientific discourse, for example, 
can only process observational reports. Observations are contextual to the 
mechanisms of social coordination; communication can provide 
observational reports with meaning.  
 
In a second step, the confusion got worse. The second-order “observer,” 
that is, the one who is reflexive on the first-order one in the double 
contingency and thus constitutive of the social system as an inter-human 
communication system, is turned into a first-order one when Luhmann3 
(1999, at p. 20) formulated that “the second-order observer, mind you, is 
a first-order observer as well, for he must distinguish and designate the 
observer he intends to observe.” Thus, the observer is at the same time 
made formal (allegedly with the authority of Spencer Brown) and 
naturalized as a first-order observer (“he”). 
 
In my opinion, the sociological enterprise begins with reflexivity about 
the analytical differences between the observational reports of participant 
observers and analytical observers. Giddens (1976) elaborated the 
potential difference in positions between observers and participants in 
terms of a “double hermeneutics,” and Geertz (1973) distinguished 
“emic” from “etic.” Naturalistic observations are out of the question 
because the participants’ and the analysts’ roles can then become 
analytically confused. When the first-order observation of a participant is 
equated with the second-order one of a reflexive analyst without 
sufficient reflexivity about the changes in position specified in a research 
design, the sociological research program can be expected to degenerate 
(Leydesdorff, 2006).  
 
Language 
 
In a follow-up to his debate with Luhmann1 in 1971, Habermas (1986) 
acknowledged that Luhmann2 had made important steps: the subject as 
the centre of reflection in traditional philosophy was replaced with a 
system’s notion, which objectifies Husserl’s notion of an intersubjective 
monad. Habermas (1986, at p. 385) praised Luhmann2 as a sociologist: 
 
As Luhmann’s astonishing job of translation demonstrates, 
this language can be so flexibly adapted and expanded that 
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it yields novel, not merely objectivating but objectivistic 
descriptions even of subtle phenomena of the lifeworld. 
 
According to Habermas, this objectivation replaces meta-physics with a 
meta-biology because meaning-processing in the social system is 
prelinguistically defined as a referential context of actualizable 
possibilities that is related to the intentionality of experience and action 
(Ibid., p.369). In other words, the horizon of meanings is naturalized as 
transcendentally given. (In this respect, Luhmann followed Husserl, for 
whom the meditation precedes the discourse.) According to Habermas, 
however, this sociological theory—which externalized both 
consciousness and language—had unfortunately led to a concept of 
monadically encapsulated consciousness systems (à la Robinson Crusoe) 
who live in administrations with mailboxes for incoming and outgoing 
communications.  
 
Habermas’s alternative of “linguistically generated intersubjectivity,” in 
my opinion, is not incompatible with the systems-theoretical approach, 
but the linguistic medium of communication has then to be specified as 
more complex than telephone lines. Künzler (1987, at p. 323) noted that 
“contrary to Parsons who used linguistic models for code of 
communication, Luhmann wished to derive his media-theoretical concept 
of code from the model of genetic code.” Luhmann understands “code” 
as a rule for duplication. Against Parsons, Luhmann emphasized that the 
symbolically generalized media of communication are not a 
specialization of language, but a supplement to it.  
 
According to Künzler (1987, at p. 331), Luhmann2’s model is meta-
biological because language “is considered as a disturbing element which 
cannot be eliminated” from systems theory or its subtheories. The 
evolutionary perspective of explaining human language and its further 
development into symbolically generalized codes of communication in 
terms of exchanges of information is not developed. The function of 
language and symbolically generalized media of communication as 
supra-individual coordination mechanisms was not elaborated, although 
the materials were available in the writings of Parsons and Habermas. 
How can one understand language and codification in terms of the model 
of autopoiesis at the level of the social system? 
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Let me follow Luhmann (2002, at p. 175) that human language can be 
considered as an evolutionary achievement. The evolutionary 
achievement can be specified using communication theory (Leydesdorff, 
2000, 2001): language allows us to communicate using two channels for 
a communication at the same time without fixing the interface between 
them. Cells in a neural net can only fire at different frequencies and thus 
communicate (Shannon-type) information. Upon reception, this 
information can be converted into meaningful information by discarding 
the noise. The meaningful information can again be communicated in a 
next-order domain (Maturana, 1978). However, language enables us to 
communicate both uncertainty (that is, Shannon-type information) and 
meaning. The meaning is not in the message, but it can be reconstructed 
from the message because the message is expected to contain both 
information and meaning. The meaning is imprinted as meaningful 
information which can be reconstructed by a receiver from the 
information received. The meaning is not given in the information. 
However, one is able to distinguish between the information content of a 
message and its meaning, and bring this distinction again into the 
communication.  
 
Not all information is meaningful, and meaning can also be 
communicated without using language. In methodological terms, one can 
think of codes of communication as one more (that is, a third) degree of 
freedom in differentiated communications. The codes enable us to focus 
on specific selections. From an evolutionary perspective, selections can 
be stabilized by codification if they are functional for the reproduction of 
the system. The codes of communication thus add a third dimension to 
the communication. Some information is more meaningful than others, 
but the meaning at the supra-individual level is decided in a social system 
in accordance with the prevailing codes of communication.  
 
When the coding prevails, a jargon is formed which closes the group of 
potential communicators, or the communication can even go on without 
using words; two (of the three) dimensions are already sufficient for 
meaningful communication. In inter-human communications, however, 
the coding remains embedded in the linguistic processing as a next-order 
recursion, just as the linguistic exchange remains embedded as a 
recursion in the information exchanges. Once in place, however, there is 
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no longer reason to prioritize one layer over another: one can leave this 
open as an empirical question. 
 
For example, on the market place one can pay the price of a commodity 
with money (coins and banknotes) without further communication in 
language. In another context one may have to negotiate about the price in 
language. More abstract payment by credit cards requires a signature or 
an equivalent exchange of linguistic symbols. Using another symbolically 
generalized medium of communication, one may not need many words to 
express one’s affection in an emotional relation, but in most cases a 
linguistic communication is also needed (e.g., “I love you.”). Roses do 
not always do the job without words.☺ In other words, one obtains an 
empirical field of research questions about how codes of communication 
operate and sometimes make linguistic communications superfluous. The 
inter-human communication system has three dimensions available for 
processing this complexity: uncertainty, mediation, and symbolization. 
 
Using Maturana’s (2000) definition of a recursion (provided above), we 
are now able to specify the differences between biological systems, 
psychological systems, and social systems of communication in these 
terms. A neuron fires or does not fire: (Shannon-type) information is 
transmitted. The channel is one-dimensional; both at the sending and the 
receiving ends an embedded observer is needed. In other words, the brain 
cells are structurally coupled to the neural net. If a recursion occurs, 
however, another domain can be shaped endogenously. This domain is 
operationally closed as a next-order cycle on top of the information flow. 
The non-linear cycle allows the system to handle more complexity, but in 
the biological system each level has its own mechanism and medium. If 
the levels were allowed to penetrate into each other, the biological 
systems under study would be at risk of dying. This is most obvious in 
the blood-brain barrier.  
 
Human language is an evolutionary achievement. It is not just an 
extension of the biological domain with another recursion. The 
evolutionary achievement, in my opinion, is that two channels of the 
communication are available, and this distinction is no longer hardwired. 
This allows us to reconstruct the information received in terms of 
uncertainty (Shannon-type information) and meaningful information. One 
can expect that a message in language is provided with meaning by a 
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sender. The meaning can be reconstructed from the message by a receiver 
because the message contains meaningful information in addition to 
Shannon-type information. The coupling between the carriers of the 
communication and the communication is not only structural, but also 
operational because of this interface between meaningful information and 
uncertainty within the message. A system which operates with messages 
is different from a (biological) system which operates in terms of signals. 
 
The volatile operation of providing meaning to the messages is recursive 
at the level of the social system, but not yet at the level of individual 
consciousness because of the latter’s embodiment. On top of the 
information flow and the flow of meaningful information, a next-order 
layer at the level of the social system can be shaped along the 
eigenvectors of the communication network which no longer rests on 
embodiment—and hence on a life-cycle—but on codifications.  
 
While these eigenvectors are spanned orthogonally, the system can 
increasingly be expected to drift towards functional differentiation in 
terms of the codes of communication. However, the eigenvectors are 
analytical constructs which remain latent for the participating 
communicators. They operate “behind our backs” (Marx). As the codes 
are functionally differentiated, they can accelerate the communication of 
meaning by orders of magnitude. The social system thus gains a degree 
of freedom for processing complexity. 
 
Unlike the hardwired dividing lines among operational domains in 
biological systems, the communication of uncertainty, meaningful 
information, and meaning remains permeable for one another. These 
distinctions are not hardwired, but culturally constructed. The codes of 
communication remain embedded in language, but they can operate 
beyond language. A reflexive agent can always prefer a lower 
acceleration: if uncertainty arises about the quality of the communication 
at the symbolic level, explanation in language is needed. One may wish 
to go back to the first acceleration by writing everything out so that the 
distinction between the information content and the meaning of the 
message can be more objectified than in interactions. The communication 
can then even be faxed over a telephone line (that is, in terms of 
Shannon-type information).  
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The three channels are contained in the evolutionary achievement of 
inter-human language. Languaging is different from barking among dogs 
or signaling among delphins. Not only information is conveyed, but also 
meaning. This can be done because the information has a position in a 
semantic field. When the three layers are conceptualized as horizontally 
super-imposed in a hierarchy, the complexity cannot yet be unfolded. The 
orthogonalization of the codes of communication under the condition of 
modernity dissolved the idea of control. Self-organization in the 
communication of meaning becomes increasingly possible when the 
codes of communication can be appreciated as an additional degree of 
freedom.  
meaning 
coding 
meaningful 
information 
languaging 
uncertainty 
structuration 
 
Figure 2: Three dimensions of communication 
 
Figure 2 shows this unfolding of the capacity of interhuman 
communications in terms of relevant dimensions. The image would 
become even one step more complex if one could account for functional 
differentiation of the codes of communication. The symbolically 
generalized codes then become feedbacks on all the axes and planes 
between them. For example, the structuration becomes different 
depending on which symbolically generalized code prevails in a given 
instance. All codes resound, but in specific instances some are suppressed 
more than others.  
 
Herbert Simon (1962) conjectured that all systems can be considered as 
composed from alphabets. Perhaps some 20+ codes are involved, perhaps 
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less. The combinatorial possibilities are immense because the possible 
languages are multiplied by this additional dimension of next-order 
codifications. The codes resound in all inter-human communication, 
whether the communication is linguistic or not. Note that Luhmann’s 
premise that everything that happens between human beings can be 
considered as communication and thus be analyzed in these terms 
requires an empirical theory of communication complex enough to 
explain the non-trivial turns that the social system can take. Monkeys and 
dogs are able to understand symbolic gestures, but they don’t have the 
richness of a language available. Three subdynamics are needed to 
generate the full scope of non-linear possibilities (May & Leonard, 1975).  
 
For example, in a scientific discourse one can exchange data without 
much wording, argue with words, and/or invoke the code of 
communication which Luhmann characterized as true or false. By 
considering the codes as spanning dimensions one obtains all the grey 
shades of communication and therefore room for empirical analysis. A 
richer dimensionality enables us to bring together what has been remote, 
that is, by providing it with a new meaning in terms of a translation of 
one geometrical representation into another.  
 
Using geometrical metaphors, representations in language can be 
conceptualized as either instantiations (at one moment of time) or 
trajectories (over time). In the case of an instantiation one explains the 
complexity in the aggregate at a certain moment and in the case of 
describing a trajectory the time axis is used for structuring the narrative. 
As Giddens (1984) noted, one of the available dimensions is bracketed in 
either case. Luhmann (1984) used the metaphor of a blind spot implied in 
a theoretical appreciation, more generally. One needs to select one 
background or another to stabilize a perspective. Because Luhmann did 
not develop this concept of a translation among geometrical metaphors, 
he considered different perspectives mainly as paradoxes to be resolved 
historically instead of analytically (Law, 1986).  
 
By focusing on translations as changes in the specification of uncertainty, 
an external super-observer can be reintegrated into the linguistic domain 
among participant-observers only if the medium allows for reflexive 
communication. Whereas a biological function has to be reproduced 
(following the pattern given in the life-cycle), it remains dependent upon 
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the reception among the participant/observers whether and how a social 
function is shaped. In a high-culture, roles were pre-ordained and 
function tended to be equated with meaning while this social system was 
stratified. In this configuration, the super-system is still identifiable (e.g., 
as the King). When the cosmological order is broken, roles may be 
reflexively acknowledged or not, and the meaning of a communication 
can increasingly be distinguished from its function.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The bridge between theorizing and empirical research provides a crucial 
step because only operationalizable theories can be methodologically 
informed and controlled. Luhmann2 acknowledged this, for example, 
when he formulated: “In order to validate the binary code of true and 
false, one needs programs of a different type. We call these programs 
Methods.” (Luhmann, 1990a, at p. 413). On the next page he specified 
that “one can consider it the task of a methodology to keep track of the 
difference between the first and second order.” Note that this reflection is 
not so far removed from Giddens’s (1976) “double hermeneutics” except 
for Giddens’s awareness that this distinction cannot be made without 
uncertainty, and therefore reflexivity.  
 
Luhmann believed in black and white (true or false as in logic)—“um zur 
Entscheidung für den einen statt den anderen Wahrheitswert zu 
kommen”—while empirical research requires the expression of 
uncertainties and the testing of significance at a probability level. 
Luhmann (1990a, at p. 176) himself italicized the sentence “Truth itself is 
not relative.” In my opinion, this claim is inconsistent with the idea that 
truth can be considered as a symbolically generalized code of 
communication. If one accepts that truth is the code of communication in 
scientific discourse, then it should operate as a latent and therefore 
uncertain dimension of this discourse.  
 
The starting point of my perspective is the uncertainty which prevails and 
its expression in bits of information. Shannon’s (1948) mathematical 
theory of communication can be elaborated into an information calculus 
which includes the time dimension (Bar-Hillel, 1955; Theil, 1972; 
Brooks & Wiley, 1986; Leydesdorff, 1995 and 2001). Only a calculus—
beyond a logic—can account for time. We are in the fortunate situation of 
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having both this methodological apparatus available and the rich 
theorizing from Luhmann2. However, the empirically interested social 
scientist should resist the tendency in Luhmann3 to develop a grandiose 
theory in which everything is sufficiently explained insofar as it can be 
distinguished and designated.  
 
The naturalization and generalization of “observation” as a foundational 
category by Luhmann3 generated a meta-biological research program. 
This meta-biological research program is anti-humanistic and anti-
sociological because reflexivity in inter-human communication and 
codification is no longer sufficiently appreciated (Husserl, 1929). The 
“double contingency” between expectations and observations is resolved 
in favor of the latter. Consequently, observation is not considered as a 
construct of a (potentially scientific) discourse and uncertainty in the 
(double!) contingencies can no longer be specified.  
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